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The [European] ‘common’ market implied competition between firms, but 
co-operation between states. This keystone of European construction was 
removed when member states and the Commission took up the project of a 
deregulated market, with the wholesale elimination of restrictions in any 
country or sector to the free circulation of capital and goods. Such an 
approach is bound to undermine solidarity between member states, 
creating competition between national legal systems—particularly in the 
sphere of labour law—within the EU itself.  
Soupiot (2006: 118) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article we illustrate the emergence of what we define as the meta-regulated 
European social space, with special reference to industrial relations. We explore the 
gradual institutionalisation of meta-regulation as a novel, market-enhancing, mode of 
governance in the EU by discussing cases pertaining to labour law and industrial relations 
in the EU covering the period 2005-10. Meta-regulation concerns the governing the 
transnational interactions between a) the collective rights inscribed in member states’ 
labour laws, and between b) the principles and norms embodied in these laws vs. the 
principles and norms regarding the regulation of the free movement of services in all EU 
Member States.  
 
Our work used as its starting point an insightful observation by Supioti when, as far back 
as 2006, he remarked that ‘there is already a glaring contradiction between the rules 
originating from the old common market project (aiming at the harmonization of member 
states’ laws, especially in the social and environmental fields) and those stemming from 
the new global-market project (aiming at setting national legal systems in competition 
with each other).’ We argue that this ‘glaring contradiction’ is currently being resolved in 
terms unfavourable to European labour and provide an appropriate conceptual framework 
and empirical evidence to support our assessment.  
 
Our paper comprises three parts. In the first part we define three concepts that are central 
to our analysis; namely, structural power, European social space and meta-governance. In 
the second and empirical part, our research examines five (5) cases that sign-post the 
gradual emergence of meta-regulation in the EU social space. In this way our work builds 
and expands from the research of Lillie and Greer on the European construction sector 
and in particular their plea that comparative industrial relations should take seriously the 
connection between action at the national and transnational levels. 
 
The discussion of the first case concerns an early top-down attempt, the so-called Service 
directive. It is followed by discussion of four more recent cases, which we define as 
bottom-up attempts, namely, the cases of ‘Laval’, ‘Viking’, ‘Rüffert’ and ‘Luxemburg’ 
and the respective rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). We consider the 
Service Directive and the ECJ rulings as representative attempts to institutionalise a 
hierarchy of norms by proxy, by making competition the main principle of regulating the 
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diversity of diversity of socioeconomic life in the European Union (EU). The ECJ cases 
demonstrate that the challenge for the governance of labour-capital relation in the EU is 
not solely over the competition of wages between workers but also over how EU 
institutions might favour the inclusion of other collective agreements than the existing 
national ones.  
 
In the third part, the article discusses how these developments indicate not only a 
tendency to institutionalise downward competition between wages at EU level but also to 
a tendency to institutionalise a downward competition between different national 
collective agreements within the (emerging) EU social space. We argue that what is, 
effectively, being created here is an EU ‘market’ of national regulations and that, 
fundamentally, the ECJ rulings are about the struggle over the ‘hierarchy of values’ that 
will frame the emerging European social space and its process of integration in the 
decades to come. This is a struggle in which, so far, European labour seems to be on the 
loosing side and in our article we aim to explore not only what has happened and its 
implications but also provide, and test, a conceptual framework that may help us 
comprehend the scale and quality of changes in the landscape of industrial relations and 
public policy in Europe. 
 
Three key concepts: structural power, social space, meta-governance  
 
First, when we use the concept of power we refer to a dynamic relation between social 
agents. We intentionally distinguish between power as a dynamic relation and power as a 
resource. Instead of referring to actors having power (i.e. the more colloquial use of the 
term), we understand social agents as exercising power by mobilizing power resources in 
any, or all, of three dimensions - structural, relational and discursiveii. The most relevant 
aspect for the purposes of our article is structural power, similar to what Hay (2002) 
describes as the context-shaping aspect of social action. Exercising power in this 
dimension is achieved by mobilising power resources in order to defend or alter the 
institutions and/or the mode of governance that regulate the distribution of these power 
resources, i.e. by influencing the rules of the game.  
 
By exploring this dimension, analysis can reveal the instituting capacity of social agents. 
Power asymmetries can be observed as differences in the capacity of social agents to 
maintain or alter the ‘rules of the game’, given that changes in the form and content of 
institutions usually follow changes in the capacity of agents to mobilize structural power 
resources. In this context, structural power is the dynamic relation between social agents 
in their attempt to defend or alter how regulatory processes are consolidated 
institutionally. The outcome of this dynamic relation ‘translates’ into both the contents of 
institutions and the modes of instituting them. Institutions, in this context, are understood 
as “structurations of power and as residues of conflict” (Korpi 2001: 8).  
 
Second, with the term social space we refer to a spatially and temporally specific 
combination of two elements: a mode of governance with its corresponding institutions, 
and the interacting social agents with their power resources. The term is inspired by 
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Bourdieu (1985) who used it to define a multidimensional field of social action created 
and institutionally (re)constituted by the power dynamics between social actors. A social 
space is regulated by a (territorially and temporally contingent) mode of governance, of 
which the institutional architecture and its corresponding core instituting norm (e.g. 
competition, co-operation, solidarity) determines how power resources will be 
redistributed in the social space. Although social spaces are of different regulatory scales 
(e.g. local, national, transnational), they are also linked, often related hierarchically. Of 
interest to us is not only the character of social spaces of action at different scales - for 
example the different types of national employment models, national production regimes 
or the ‘European social model’ etc. - but also how they relate to each other and how, and 
at which scale, their relationship is regulated.  In this context, our article examines how 
the structural power asymmetry between unions and employers is currently articulated in 
the shifting levels of governance and spaces of action in EU, by examining how the 
interaction between national social spaces is regulated at the European level. We argue 
that the locus of the power dynamic between labour and capital in EU is shifting from 
national social spaces into an emerging European social space. The latter is not merely the 
summation of national social spaces plus the EU institutional layer – the set of supra-
national and intergovernmental arrangements – but, crucially, an emerging social space of 
action for actors who use the opportunities provided by the mode of governance that 
regulates the interaction between these two levels of social action. 
 
Finally, our article adopts an analytical definition of governance to refer to both the 
content of institutions in a social space and the mode of instituting it (see also Carmel and 
Papadopoulos 2003). However, in trans-national institutional formations, like the EU, 
governance is not limited to the mode of governing at one level of social action but also 
about the governing of the interplay between different modes of governance and between 
different levels of social action. To avoid conceptual conflations we adopt Jessop’s 
concept of meta-governance to refer to the emerging mode of governance of the European 
social space (as defined above). We argue that the aforementioned shift from national 
social spaces into an emerging European social space is accompanied by the re-
articulation of powers and a re-territorialisation of social relations (Brenner et al. 2003), 
meta-regulated to favour capital and the market rationale.  
 
Drawing from recent events in the development of EU labour relations our article 
examines in the next session the attempts to institute market-enhancing modes of meta-
governance either through the proposals of the European Commission or through the ECJ 
rulings. We argue that the ability of trade unions to act as a collective actor in the 
European social space is significantly hampered by the particular form of (emerging) 
meta-governance and we empirically explore the characteristics of the latter.  
 
The article continues with what was regarded as a ‘neo-liberal’ attempt to integrate 
services market through the Service directive and is presented as a typical example of an 
attempt to regulate models of national industrial relations.  
 
Regulating labour relations in the European social space: From harmonisation to 
competition  
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The Service Directive has its origins in the guidelines named after the Dutch 
Commissioner for internal market issues in the EU, Frits Bolkestein, which aimed to 
liberalise the provision of services in the European social space and attempted to further 
integrate the services market as stated in the Lisbon strategy. According to the Bolkestein 
guideline, services could be bought depending on the wage prices of the country of origin 
of the service provider. The initial plan of this guideline was to ‘harmonise’ the internal 
labour market by withdrawing market distortions (national agreements) in the service 
sector in the European social space. Apart from ‘harmonisation’ the possible adoption of 
the guideline would cancel the national collective bargaining and simultaneously provide 
the necessary regulation to promote downward wage competition between EU citizens. 
 
The proposal sparked fierce protests in countries with ‘coordinated market economies’, a 
term that we borrow from the Varieties of Capitalism literature (see Hall and Soskice 
2001; Menz 2005). Despite the political clout in several countries, the succeeding 
Commissioner McGreevy and the Commission President Barroso were willing to put 
through their reform agenda and the Service Directive was at the heart of this attempt. 
However, the Service Directive was not welcomed and the example of the ‘Polish 
plumber’ that would undermine the wage and working conditions of French plumbers, 
managed to mobilise a majority that rejected the adoption of the European Constitution. It 
was clear with the French ‘non’ in March 2005 that the Service Directive attracted a lot of 
attention, enough to halt the approval of the European Constitution.  
 
Almost ten months later, the Service Directive passed through European Parliament but 
with significant amendments limiting the impact of ‘harmonisation’. The split of 
employers’ interests along with the ETUC lobbying for the amendment of the proposal, 
paved the way for a distinct alliance of interests within the European parliament (Dølvin 
and Ødergård 2009). In terms of voting, the social democratic parties and the Christian 
democratic parties voted in favour of the amended proposal. In contrast, liberal parties 
expressed their concern that the proposal is not meeting the needs for a ‘harmonised’ 
labour market and the conservative parties from Great Britain, Spain, Netherlands, 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic rejected the revised proposal. Left wing and 
communist parties voted also against the proposal. The voting was very much based on “a 
mixture of a ‘left-right divide’ and a ‘clash of capitalisms’” (Höpner and Shäefer 2007: 
14). In the end the Commission presented a proposal that incorporated the amendments 
voted by the Parliament and the European Council of Economic Ministers accepted 
unanimously the ratified proposals. 
 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) was satisfied with the abolishment of 
the ‘country of origin of clause’ and regarded the end result as a ‘success’. However, 
ETUC remained rather less sceptical about the abolishment of the ‘respect for 
fundamental rights’ and its replacement to the respect of the Community law (ETUC). 
The ‘country of origin’ clause is abolished but it is replaced by the ‘freedom to provide 
services’, which as we will show effectively introduces elements of downward wage 
pressures to the coordinated market economies. The abolishment of the ‘country of origin 
clause’ and its replacement with the ‘freedom to provide services’, was not thoroughly 
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examined or understood by relevant actors; for example ETUC celebrated the exclusion 
of the ‘country of origin’ clause but,  at least publicly,  failed to capture the implications 
of the new legislation for the service providers in the private sector. 
 
The new legislation that was approved by the European Parliament links the Member 
states’ labour and workers protection to be interpreted by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and its interpretation on a “case by case” basis, in compliance with the Community 
law (European Union 2006: 11). Essentially the right to collective action was not 
undermined directly by the Service Directive but subjected to the approval of the ECJ 
doctrine on the proportionality of restrictions on the freedom to provide services (Novitz 
2008). Suffice to say, ECJ rulings are not known for their protecting but rather its 
promoting business and competition friendly decisions, while others argue that 
Community law itself is not protecting labour rights (see Davies 1997). 
 
As Supiot writes, the European Commission (CEM 2005) in its paper for ‘Better 
Lawmaking’ stated that EU’s ‘regulatory environment’ should further promote European 
competitiveness through the creation of an ‘expert committee’ that would assess and filter 
policy proposals that harm European competitiveness. According to the guidelines on 
impact assessment, new legislation both at national and European level has to be 
thoroughly scrutinised for its impact at economic and competition aspects. The adoption 
of these assessment criteria prioritise competition and effectively pre-empt any significant 
attempts of new legislations to challenge the dominant logic of competition (CEM 2002; 
2005; 2006). Further regulatory attempts should be kept at minimum level, locking thus 
the ability of new legislature into a framework that promotes the market rationale. The 
market rationale thus “is no longer limited to the realm of the economy; it is now the 
organising precept of the juridical sphere” (Supiot 2006: 116). In this way ‘competition’ 
becomes the main principle of the policy making, setting in motion a regulatory 
mechanism that would reject any policy that might harm competition and would only 
allow through its filter, policy proposals that are taken within this logic. This ‘cata-
regulation’ or ‘meta-regulation’ (Supiot 2006) provides a new mode of governance that 
 
“tends to exclude or dominate competing ways of understanding regulatory policy 
choices. It institutionalises a presumption in favour of market governance, and this causes 
bureaucrats to reframe or ‘translate’ aspects of social welfare that previously may have 
been expressed in the language of need, vulnerability or harm into the language of market 
failures or market distortion. Not only does this translation tend to silence certain critical 
modes of demanding justice, particularly those that rely on moral or distributive values, 
but the institutional solutions which bureaucrats advance to secure the ‘translated’ social 
welfare values render them politically vulnerable” (Morgan 2003:2). 
 
These attempts to ‘economise’ social spaces using ‘top-down’ means are witnessed in the 
case of the ‘Bolkestein proposal’ and the EC directives. However the pressures do not 
stem just from the bureaucratic and political elites in the EU. As it will be shown, 
European firms based on the EU legislation are effectively driving a competition between 
national labour laws (Supiot 2006). As it will be shown in the next section, the ECJ 
rulings explicitly did not touch upon harmonisation but instead opted to consolidate 
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competition between state regulations as they key principle for regulating socioeconomic 
conditions within the European social space.  
 
 
 
Collective action vs ‘freedom to provide services’: The ‘Laval’ case 
 
All of four ECJ cases resemble significant turning points to the competition between state 
regulation and the role of nationally based collective bargaining between labour and 
capital.  In the Laval case, the City of Vaxholm in Sweden was interested to renovate a 
school and the city council selected the offer of the Latvia-based company ‘Laval’. In the 
agreement signed between the two contractors, it was stated that in order for the collective 
agreement between the firm and its employers to be effective in Sweden, collective 
bargaining should be under the Swedish Labour law and thus Swedish trade unions 
should participate in the collective agreements.  
 
Laval initiated negotiations with the Swedish construction union (‘Byggnads’) but did not 
accept the terms and wage rates complied by Swedish collective bargaining regulations 
and instead employed Latvian workers that would be posted to Sweden. Laval suggested 
that it had the right to negotiate wages according to Latvian collective agreements. On 
their behalf, ‘Byggnars’ exercised their right -in accordance with Swedish labour law- and 
reacted with industrial action and a blockade.  
 
It is of interest to note, that the first collective agreement in Latvia came in 2004 and was 
covering only the members of the trade unions. Since ‘Laval’ workers were not unionised, 
the company could not state that it followed the Latvian collective agreement. However, 
soon a second national collective agreement became effective in Latvia that provided 
coverage to all employees while it issued that workers in Latvian companies can only be 
legally represented by the Latvian trade unions and therefore any collective agreement 
should be in accordance with the Latvian laws (Byggnards 2005). The response of the 
Latvian government through the alteration of collective agreement’s coverage was both 
reflexive and strategic; it manifests how important is the role of the state in facilitating 
competitive advantages for national capital interests. 
 
The Latvian company was able to exploit the confusion between the Swedish labour law 
and the EU laws. According to the latter and the freedom of establishment, every 
employer should at least pay to workers according to the national minimum wage. The 
crucial point here is that Swedish collective bargaining is not binding for all workers and 
employers and neither is the state enforcing such agreementsiii. Due to well organised 
trade unions and employers, the Swedish collective bargaining achieves a great coverage 
and problems of collective action are thus dealt through peak and sectoral organisations. 
Despite their extensive legislative framework and application, the Swedish industrial 
relations do not declare a minimum wage. Part of unions strength stems from their 
negotiating power in determining wages with employers, therefore the existence of a 
minimum wage would undermine their power as organisations and as social partners. 
Laval pointed out that since there is no minimum wage and the application of agreements 
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are not binding, then there are not obliged to pay the wage that is determined among 
Swedish social partners (Woolfson and Sommers 2006: 59). While the unions were 
backed up by the Swedish centre-right government, the Confederation of Swedish 
Employers (SN) supported and funded Laval’s case before the court (ibid: 61). Laval 
referred the case to the Swedish Labour Court and the latter to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) with the question whether the Swedish trade unions right to collective 
action is at odds with the ‘freedom to provide services’ principle.  
 
In December 2007, the rulings of the ECJ were received with conflicting emotions from 
the various actors involved. Certainly, the Confederation of the Swedish Enterprise (SN) 
were delighted with the rulings on Laval;  
 
“this is good for the free movement of services. You can’t raise obstacles for 
foreign companies to come to Sweden” (Financial Times 2007).  
 
The ETUC received the ECJ ruling with ‘disappointment’ and regarded the decision as a 
challenge for the successful ‘models of flexicurity’ (ETUC 2007a). It is clear from the 
rulings that the ECJ prioritised competition and the freedom to provide services over the 
right to collective action: 
 
 “It must be pointed out that the right of the trade unions of a member state to take 
collective action by which undertakings established in other Member states may 
be forced to sign the collective agreement for the building sector-certain terms of 
which depart from the legislative provisions and establish more favourable terms 
and conditions of employment – is liable to make it less attractive or more 
difficult, for such undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, and 
therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the 
meaning of Article 49 EC (i.e. provision of services)” (ECJ 2007a, Point 99, 
parenthesis added). 
 
 
Coordinated action vs ‘freedom to establish’: The case of ‘Viking’ 
 
The case of the Finnish ship ‘Rosella’ and its owner firm ‘Viking’ is another case that 
illustrates how EU is mediating a competition between different state regulations. The 
Finnish firm that operates the route from Helsinki to Tallinn realised that if the ship was 
under Esthonian and not Finnish flag it would benefit through lower wages and thus 
enhance its competitive advantage over other firms. The Finnish Seamen Workers Union 
(FSU) contacted the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) for the intention of 
the Finnish shipping firm. The ITF advised FSU that according to ‘Flags of Convenience’ 
policy, wages and condition of employment are to be decided upon the national 
agreements of Finland since the ship is owned by a Finnish firm irrespectively of its will 
to employ Esthonian workers. At the same time as the negotiations for collective 
agreement between the ‘Viking’ and the FSU occurred, ‘Viking’ applied to the Court that 
any agreements would not have an immediate effect (ECJ 2006). As a response, FSU 
declared a warning for industrial action (November 2003). 
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‘Viking’ appealed to the Finnish Courts in order to cancel the industrial action of the trade 
unions and ask also for compensation. In December 2003, both actors entered again 
negotiations and a new revised agreement was reached. However, in 2004, ‘Viking’ 
addressed the UK Commercial Court since the ITF had its base in London. The judge’s 
decision was against the coordination of action on behalf of the trade unions. The decision 
stated that trade unions could result in industrial action for the re-flagging of the ship 
while the judge forced ITF to withdraw all letters to affiliated trade unions. The rationale 
of the decision was that the actions of the FSU and ITF was against the EU law and 
hampered competition. The Finnish unions appealed and the case was referred to the ECJ. 
 
In the Viking case, the ECJ recognised as fundamental the right to collective action, if 
however all other means of protest are exhausted and the action does not harm the 
freedom to provide services (ECJ 2007b, point 44-5). The vagueness of this ruling is 
pretty obvious; can a right be fundamental and be restricted under conditions, especially 
when the latter are not that clear? The judgement of the ECJ is not denying the ability of 
unions for collective action in the national space of action but under certain conditions; 1) 
the action has to be a last resort and exhaust other means that do not harm operation of the 
firms and 2) that actions to block ‘the freedom of establishment’ are justified if they result 
in worse working conditions.  
 
While the rulings on the Viking case were received with more enthusiasm by ETUC, in 
our opinion, they missed a significant point. The ECJ is safeguarding employees’ right to 
collective action, as much as it is willing to prevent a coordinated action on behalf of 
national unions within the European social space. The ECJ pre-empts any ability of 
unions to show solidarity through blockades in Europe since such an action is deemed to 
exercise discriminatory effects on the freedom of movement for persons and to provide 
services (ECJ 2007b, points 57-66; see also Achtsioglou 2010). The ruling of the case of 
Viking manifests how the ECJ prevents coordination of union action across European 
social space and instead prioritises competition over the right to collective action. 
 
 
Counting losses: ECJ rulings on Rüffert and Luxemburg cases 
 
Apart from thee two cases that were discussed in detail, two more cases ended up in the 
ECJ jurisdiction and significantly challenged national collective bargaining and labour 
law across Europe. The ‘Rüffert’ case referred to the ability of a Polish subcontractor to 
provide constructing services at 46.5% of the wage that the German workers were entitled 
to. Similar to the Laval case, the ECJ declared that due to the lack of a minimum wage in 
Lower Saxony and the lack of a universally (national) applicable collective agreement, 
any obligation for improved wages and working conditions under the German public law 
is not applicable and restrictive to the fundamental freedom to provide services 
(Schalchter and Fischinger 2009).  
 
In a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice (dated 15 July 2010) the German 
state was condemned  
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‘over the practice of local authority employers to award contracts for pension 
services on the basis of a selection laid down in collective agreements. […] the 
Court ruled that although the right to collective bargaining is a fundamental right, 
the European public procurement rules should prevail’ (ETUC 2010).  
 
The ECJ ruling (2010) refers to the precedent of Laval and Viking cases in order to argue 
that the right to collective bargaining is withheld in order to secure the freedom to provide 
services and of establishment with the European social space. In the ruling of the Rüffert 
case, it takes a step further to question Member States authority on determining public 
procurement law:  
 
“While it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys in Germany the 
constitutional protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) of the German Basic 
Law upon the right to form associations to safeguard and promote working and 
economic conditions, the fact remains that, as provided in Article 28 of the 
Charter, that right must be exercised in accordance with European Union law”. 
 
In the ‘Luxemburg’ case, the European Commission suggested that the Luxembourgian 
application of the Posted Workers Directive (PWD) was too extensive. Luxemburg in 
accordance with the PWD set mandatory conditions under which posted workers can 
provide their services and effectively incorporating these changes under public policy 
provisions. These conditions were the following: 
 
• requirement of a written employment contract or a written document 
established in accordance with Directive 91/533, 
• automatic indexation of remuneration to the cost of living, 
• the regulation of part-time work and fixed-term work, 
• respect of collective agreements. 
 
 The ECJ issued that members states’ demands over posted workers’ wages and working 
conditions, as posed by the country of destination, are restrictive to Article AC 49 and the 
‘freedom to provide services’.  The ruling of the ECJ goes to suggest that  
 
“… national mandatory agreements are applicable only when they do not violate 
the freedom to provide services” (ECJ 2008). 
 
In principle, in the Luxemburg case the ECJ ruling touch upon Member States jurisdiction 
on what consists a public policy provision since the ECJ ruled that national mandatory 
agreements are applicable only when they do not violate the freedom to provide services 
(ECJ 2008).  
 
In essence, the ECJ recognises both social rights and market freedoms as fundamental for 
the regulation of the European social space but when these two principles collide, as they 
did in these cases, the ECJ decided to set a hierarchy of norms that puts competition as 
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the superior principle for socio-economic instituting of the European social space (see 
Achtsioglou 2010). Therefore the ECJ exercised its juridical power to 
 
 
 
• prioritise the freedom to provide services over unions’ ability for collective 
action both in private (Laval case) and public undertakings (Rüffert case),  
• hamper the ability of unions to act in solidarity within the European social 
space (Viking case) and also. 
• challenge Member States right to define public policy provision (Luxemburg 
case) and procurement law (Rüffert case) within their own social space.  
 
The article moves on and discusses critically the response of the ETUC on the ECJ cases, 
as the confederation represents the vast majority of unions across Member States.  
 
 
The response of the European Trade Union Confederation 
 
Before the rulings the ETUC called Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso for a  
 
“carefully balanced approach (…) ETUC is not opposed to the development of 
the internal market or the free movement of goods, capital, services and workers. 
Nor does it promote protectionism. On the contrary, it seeks a level playing field 
between Member states, based on fair treatment and upward harmonisation of 
workers’ rights and conditions” (ETUC 2006b, our italics).  
 
The ETUC responses to the rulings of the ECJ differed in the two cases; it welcomed the 
decision of the Viking-case ruling (ETUC 2007b) since it recognised the right to 
collective action as fundamental, while the decision for the Swedish unions was received 
with ‘disappointment’ (ETUC 2007a). Almost two months after the rulings, the ETUC 
publicised its position stressing the importance of the cases and the need for Europe to 
‘repair this damage’ (ETUC 2008a). ETUC for the first time stated in public that the right 
of collective action comes second after EU’s free movement provisions. It is clear that the 
plea for a balanced approach was not enough to prioritise social protection over 
competition rules, a hierarchy that should not come as a surprise since ETUC is not 
holding any significant structural power over EU decision making and clearly remains 
under the hegemonic vision of EU-elites.  
 
It was only after the outcome of all four cases that the ETUC (2008b) changed its 
discourse and its secretary John Monks admitted: 
 
“The score at the moment is ECJ 4, European trade unions 0; and I do not 
exaggerate when I say that we are reeling at the score.” 
 
ETUC recognised that these cases were fundamental to the ability of unions not only to 
defend labour standards (e.g. wages and working conditions) but also that collective 
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bargaining and national labour law came second to the freedom to provide services and  
firms’ right to establishment. As the ETUC recognised  
 
“the ECJ seems to confirm a hierarchy of norms (in the Viking and Laval cases), 
with market freedoms highest in the hierarchy, and collective bargaining and 
action in second place. This means that organised labour is limited in its response 
to the unlimited exercise of free movement provisions by business which 
apparently does not have to justify itself. Any company in a transnational dispute 
will have the opportunity to use this judgement against trade union actions, 
alleging that actions are not justified and ‘disproportionate’”. 
 
“[…] The ECJ interprets the Posting Directive in a very restrictive way. On the 
one hand, it limits the scope for trade unions (in the Laval case) to take action 
against unfair competition on wages and working conditions […] On the other 
hand, it limits Member States (in the Rüffert case and Commission vs. 
Luxemburg case) in applying their public procurement law or public policy 
provisions on situations of posting to prevent disruption of their labour markets 
and unfair competition between local and foreign service companies” 
(ETUC2008b, bold original). 
 
The response of the ETUC as well as its analysis of the ECJ cases admitted not only that 
the main European trade union originally underestimated the challenges that the Service 
Directive and the application of the Community Law posed but mainly that the ECJ 
decisions on these four cases clearly sets a hierarchy of norms and priorities regarding the 
instituting logic of the emergent European social space.  
 
Responding to ECJ ruling on the Rüffert case, John Monks, General Secretary of the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) made the following statement: 
 
“This is another damaging judgement for social Europe. [...] This judgment 
ignores the public authorities’ independence when they are acting as employers. 
More worryingly, it also confirms the supremacy of economic freedoms over 
fundamental social rights. The dark series initiated by the Viking and Laval cases 
is far from being over.” (ETUC  2010). 
 
The response of the ETUC leaves no doubt that power imbalances are widening but at the 
same time demonstrate the weak position that the ETUC is placed in terms of ‘balancing’ 
policy making within the European social space. Furthermore, the interpretation of the 
PWD subscribes to a minimum core of labour rights and allows foreign service providers 
to circumvent collective bargaining as set by the host country’s labour institutions 
(Cremers 2008). We now move on to discuss how these power imbalances between 
labour and capital are regulated within the European social space. 
 
 
ECJ rulings on the regulatory environment and the governance of labour-capital 
relation in EU  
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We highlight at least two tensions that arise from the ECJ rulings. First, the power 
asymmetries between labour and capital are widening. It is clear in the ECJ cases that 
unions and employers strategically aimed to exercise their power not at their national or 
EU levels but more importantly within the emerging European social space of action. 
Firms such ‘Laval’ and ‘Viking’ were willing to exploit the confusion among EU and 
national labour laws while the SN (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise) strategically 
aimed in undermining the institutional context that is meant to be facilitating its 
competitive advantage. Therefore employers mobilised their power resources at both the 
national and European spaces of action.  
 
The ability of unions to respond to these pressures through collective action in the 
national social space was condemned, in the case of Laval, for harming competition and 
in particular the ‘freedom to provide services’. In the case of Viking, unions were able to 
act in coordination and effectively form a pan-European blockade that did not allow the 
Finnish firm to operate with Esthonian wages and working conditions. The ability of 
unions to act in coordinated manner across the European social space however was 
realised as a ‘discriminatory action’ against firms ‘freedom of establishment’. Therefore 
the ability of unions to protect their wages and working conditions from the logic of 
competition is hampered by what Wood (2004) calls the ‘extra-economic’; an effort 
mostly concerned with the regulation of the economic, the political and juridical coercion 
on social relations.  
 
Second, the emerging European social space is challenging national labour and political 
institutions. Both ECJ cases illustrate the role of EU as framing different institutional 
orders for domestic actors. The literature on European integration so far stress either the 
importance of nation states (Moravcik 1993; Martin 2004) as key actors while others 
(Fligstein and Sweet 2002) prioritise the importance of European institutions in driving 
European integration. We argue that focusing on the national or/and the European level 
(ala EU) is not adequately capturing the process of European integration.  
 
It is about the criteria and the hierarchy of norms underlying the process of institutionally 
constructing the European social space that could effectively undermine the perpetuation 
of national market economies and their labour institutions. For a start, national 
governments responded to the ECJ rulings; German labour law withdrew the obligation 
for remuneration from collective agreements that are not generally applicable, Luxemburg 
exempted foreign service providers from the requirements of public policy provision (see 
Silva 2010) while governments of nation states that have not set minimum wages are 
revisiting their national labour law (Sweden, Denmark). 
 
It is crucial to highlight here that the ECJ is not attempting to harmonise labour relations 
across the European social space per se but instead set competition as the main principle 
of social instituting this space. For example, the ECJ allows member states to declare 
themselves what consists minimum wage and working conditions standards (allowing 
therefore variation) while at the same time, it rules that posted workers are not subject to 
favourable terms (interpreted as ‘extensive’ by the ECJ) that may apply in the host 
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country. The ECJ rulings therefore reverse the logic of the PWD and instead of allowing 
posted workers to equally participate with favourable terms and conditions, it limits their 
rights to a minimum set of wage and working standards as set by national labour law in 
the countries that have set such a minimum. 
 
We continue to discuss how the rulings of the ECJ are attempting to consolidate 
competition within the emerging European regulatory social space as they principle for 
instituting socioeconomic life in EU.  
 
 
The impact of ‘meta-regulation’ on national labour law, institutions and trade 
unions 
 
The ECJ rulings are attempts to render competition as the hegemonic ‘rationale’ of 
institutional-making in the emerging European social space. The competition between 
state regulations that was exemplified through the strategic and reflective action of the 
Latvian government to change collective bargaining agreements captures only part of the 
picture. The ECJ cases demonstrate that the challenge for the governance of the labour–
capital relation in the EU is not solely the competition of wages between workers but how 
EU institutions might favour the inclusion of other collective agreements than the existing 
national ones, especially in countries where no minimum wages are set as universal and 
mandatory.  
 
As we discussed earlier, EU is more a social space of action rather than a supranational 
state per se. The struggle placed in this social space exemplified with the Service 
Directive, is an attempt for regulation of competition between (national) state regulations. 
Thus, this meta-regulation is mediating the decisions of the power imbalances between 
regimes to the national space of action. The outcome of this struggle is not solely a move 
to an enhancement of the market economy rationale, but also an attempt to cancel out 
established agreements in the national level between labour and capital as well as to 
consolidate a competitive labour market inside the European social space. These 
‘attempts aim not only to ‘economise’ social spaces (Morgan 2003) but crucially to make 
competition (if you prefer ‘economisation’) the dominant mode of social instituting of 
that space. 
 
What has been described is thus an attempt for regulation of competition between state 
regulations, which simultaneously undermines any notion of national sovereignty and 
pulls the rug under of the national space of action together with its historical battles. In 
this way space and time are co-opted in this new different scale of power and authority, 
distinct from any borderline and history. This re-articulation of power and a re-
territorialisation (Brenner et al. 2004; Jessop 2004) of social space displaces the relation 
between labour and capital at different levels of action. This conceptualisation of ‘meta-
regulation’ bridges the notion of ‘economisation of politics’ (Morgan 2003) as the mode 
of instituting and the competition of labour law (Supiot 2006) as the content of this form 
of governance which is viable through institutional innovation in the European social 
space of action. 
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At the level of the nation state modes of instituting across models of political economy 
maintain to a large degree their differences and we do not expect them to wither away 
(Menz 2003). However, the mode of instituting at the European level of action which 
frames the national spaces of action, is increasingly biased in favour of the market-
competition principle. Effectively, what currently emerges from these rulings is a process 
of Europeanisation that emphasises regulatory competition among member states; a 
market for state regulations.  
 
The future of the European national political economies and in this respect the future of 
national institutional configurations in Europe is directly related to the institutional 
configuration of the emerging European social space. This space is not external to the 
development of the variety of welfare capitalisms and market economies. It is constitutive 
of their trajectories and defines the terms under which their clash will be played out. What 
is at stake is therefore how EU integration transforms the institutional context, within 
which varieties of national capitalism operate and, ultimately, who governs the emerging 
European social space. In that respect our work seconds Lillie and Greer (2007) argument 
that comparative industrial relations should take seriously the connection between action 
at the national and transnational level and how actors “draw on rules and resources from 
supranational contexts and new configurations of interest” (2007: 576). In our view a shift 
of analytical focus is necessary to understand the current changes and therefore we 
conclude with some proposals for future research directions.  
 
 
Conclusion: the social embeddedness of (labour) markets and the possibility for …  
instituting of the emerging European social space 
 
The aforementioned developments resemble the historical construction of the national 
labour markets (see also Dale 2010), a process that accelerated during the late 18th and 
19th century and involved the explicit dislocation of human beings to become low wage 
labourers as well as the introduction of significant regulation attempts (e.g. New Poor 
Law). Approached as instituted processes, markets cannot be seen separately from the 
context that regulates the conduct within them (a context which itself cannot be 
marketised) and as such, markets are continuously constituted by the dynamic between 
the market conduct and the regulation of this conduct. As Polanyi demonstrated, the idea 
that the economic realm can be separated from the political, an idea that was at the heart 
of what effectively was the political construction of national market economies, is based 
on a fallacy that economic and political spheres of social life can be institutionally 
separated (Polanyi 1944: 74).  
 
We argue that a similar process is now taking place within the European social space, 
though it is not taking the form of a uniform European labour market but rather it is an 
attempt to consolidate a European market of state regulations and labour relations, with 
competition as the main principle for organised socio-economic life. Our analysis of the 
cases and the rulings of the European Court of Justice leads us to conclude that not only 
the power imbalances between trade unions and capital both within and between the EU 
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member states are widening in favour of capital but a process of radical re-embedding of 
the labour-capital relation is underway in an emerging post-national European social 
space. Indeed, it is the power dynamic of this relation that will actually determine the type 
of ‘embeddedness’ of socio-economic relations in societies that have markets (Block and 
Evans 2005) and especially in market societies, i.e. those societies in which the market 
principle is hegemonic in the sense that it has become the dominant mode of social 
instituting. 
 
As Polanyi argued the potential counter-movement cannot be exhausted in the role of 
organised labour or in the national level of action. The shifting of governance and scale of 
action should signal trade unions to react to this institutional innovation of capital, by re-
orienting their action in the new emergent spaces and territories. Whether their reaction 
will be defensive (protect established national socio-economic rights for labour), 
offensive (demand pan-European socio-economic rights for labour) or both remains to be 
seen. Currently, a response to the institutional innovation (meta-regulation) is still 
missing, allowing the ‘market imperative’ to subordinate the social needs and undermine 
the social protection rights of European citizens. It is in this new social space that EU 
trade unions among other social groups should coordinate their actions and confront the 
capital. One of the role of the potential counter-movements in Europe would be to expose 
the socio-political character of the ‘economic’, provide proposals for an alternative 
institutional order in Europe and not least, for trade unions, to retain their capacity as 
social agents in the emerging European social space. 
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i Ibid, 118-9. 
ii Relational power is the ability to force a social subject to do something that otherwise 
s/he would be reluctant to do. Discursive power is the way that society recognises, 
understands and interprets social categories within the existing power-relations; to put it 
simply, whose concepts, assumptions and  perceptions of reality are hegemonic in one or 
more social spaces. Consequently power resources have relational, structural and 
discursive properties (see Papadopoulos 2006).  This conceptualisation of power is a 
theoretical synthesis that draw its inspiration from Lukes (1975), Strange (1994), Hay 
(2002) and Bourdieu (2005). 
 
iii The same applies for Danish and German collective bargaining. 
 
